RECENT CASES

DISENROLLMENT OF STATE'S ATTORNEY BY FEDERAL
COURT FOR FAILURE TO PERFORM
OFFICIAL DUTIES
The complainants, a group of residents of the Sixteenth Judicial District of
Kentucky, brought proceedings in the Federal District Court of the Eastern
District of Kentucky to have the name of the respondent commonwealth's
attorney for Kentucky's sixteenth district removed from the roll of attorneys
of the court. Evidence was presented that for twelve years large-scale gambling
had been carried on in that district, and that a list of the names of slot machine
operators had at all times been available in the office of the collector of internal
revenue and had appeared in a local newspaper. A detective with power to
make arrests had been at the disposal of the commonwealth's attorney, but
very few raids had been made. On one occasion 196 indictments charging
gambling were returned by the grand jury at the instigation of the circuit judge,
but the respondent dismissed them on the ground that the grand jury had been
illegally impaneled. On the basis of this and of other similar evidence, the federal court, concluding that the respondent had been protecting law violators,
issued an order striking his name from its roll of attorneys. Wilbur v. Howard.,
Several efforts had previously been made to remove the respondent from his
office. In i939 the circuit court judge of the Sixteenth Judicial District instructed the grand jury to investigate the alleged failure of the commonwealth's
attorney to enforce state gambling laws, but no indictment was returned. 2 Subsequently the Attorney General of Kentucky, in a statutory proceeding similar
3
to quo warranto, unsuccessfully attempted to remove respondent from office.
The instant case appears to be another attempt to oust the respondent, since
4
the decision might become the basis for disbarment in the state courts, thus

making it impossible for him to perform the duties of his office. The holding
raises questions as to the legal basis for disenrollment and establishes a precedent for assertion by federal courts of considerable power over state officers.
170 F.

Supp. 930 (Ky., 1947).

The circuit court judge attempted to appoint a commonwealth's attorney pro tern, pending this investigation, in accordance with a statute which authorized such appointment when
the commonwealth's and county attorneys were "absent." Howard stated that he would conduct the investigation and refused to acknowledge this appointment. The Kentucky Court of
Appeals in a declaratory judgment somewhat reluctantly held that an investigation in the
absence of an indictment was not sufficient to make the commonwealth's and county attorney
legally absent. Northcutt v. Howard, 279 Ky. 219, 130 S.W. 2d 70 (1939).
3 Commonwealth v. Howard, 297 Ky. 488, i8o S.W. 2d 415 (1944).
4 Counsel for the defendant, in a memorandum submitted in support of a motion to dismiss
the complaint, argued that this was the first step in an attempt to remove Howard from office
by disbarment. The disenrollment by the federal court would be used as the basis for disbarment proceedings in the state court. See Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (x917), in which disbarment of an attorney by the Supreme Court of Michigan was regarded by the United States
Supreme Court as establishing "absence of fair private and professional character" which
would require disbarment from the bar of the court unless it appeared that the respondent had
not been given a fair hearing below.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

The legal basis for disbarment or disenrollment proceedings in general is the
theory that "every court which has power to admit attorneys to practice has
inherent authority to disbar or discipline attorneys for unprofessional conduct."s
This power is said to be inherent because it is essential to the proper functioning
of a court. Courts are to a great extent confined by the adversary system of
litigation to the cases and issues presented to them by attorneys. If attorneys
inadvertently or deliberately fail to present issues properly, courts may not be
able to administer justice. Moreover, if the attorneys are mistrusted by the
public the courts may not convince the public that justice is being administered.
The peculiarities of this particular case, however, present somewhat unusual
issues. The unprofessional conduct charged had no connection with the federal
court; the conduct consisted of failure to act rather than positive misconduct,
and the conduct was that of a state officer in his official capacity.
Although the unprofessional conduct had no direct connection with the disenrolling court, state decisions indicate that this is not essential. Disbarments
for acts unrelated to the attorney-client relationship have been frequent, 6 and
state courts have disbarred attorneys for conduct relating solely to the federal
courts located within the state.7 By analogy it may be argued that federal courts
can disenroll attorneys for conduct relating to state courts.
Further, positive misconduct rather than mere nonfeasance has not been required as grounds for disbarment. Although no clear-cut standard has been laid
down, courts usually hold that mere inattention to duty is not enough,' but
that gross, wilful, or deceitful neglect is required for suspension or disbarment.9
The courts clearly regard neglect as a reason for disbarment of prosecuting
attorneys when the failure to prosecute is prompted by money received from
law violators.Io In In re Burton,",however, where no bribery of the prosecutor
appeared, failure to prosecute an offense of which there was ample evidence
5In re Claiborne, i ig F. 2d 647, 65o (C.C.A. Ist, 1941). The leading case on disbarment by
a federal court is Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883).
6In re Information to Discipline Certain Attorneys of the Sanitary District of Chicago,
351 Ill. 2o6, 184 N.E. 332 (1932); Matter of Carver, 224 Mass. 169, 112 N.E. 877 (1916);
Matter of Dolphin, 24o N.Y. 89, 147 N.E. 538 (1925).
7 Geibel v. State Bar of California, ii Cal. 2d 412, 79 P. 2d 1073 (1938), cert. den. 3o5 U.S.
653 (1938); State v. Grover, 47 Wash. 39, 91 Pac. 564 (1907); In re Lamb, 1oS App. Div. 462,
94 N.Y. Supp. 331 (19o5).

18 Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662,

Supp. 42

(1912);

127

So. 309 (193o); In re Boehm, I5o App. Div. 443, 135 N.Y.

see 69 A.L.R. 7o5.

9Marsh v. State Bar of California, 2 Cal. 2d 75, 39 P. 2d 4o3 (x934); In re McDermit,
96 N.J.L. 17, 114 Atl. i44 (1921); see 69 A.L.R. 7o5 and In re Trimble, 85 N.J. Eq. 348, 95
Atl. 863 (I915).
1 People v. Anglim, 33 Colo. 40, 78 Pac. 687 (i9o4); In re Simpson, 9 N.D. 379, 83 N.W.
541 (igoo); In re Simpson, 79 OkIa. 305, 192 Pac. 1097 (1920); State v. Hays, 64 W.Va. 45,
61 S.E. 355 (i9o8).
1167 Utah 118, 246 Pac. 188 (1926). While this case was an attempt to disbar a judge, some
of the charges pertained to the failure to prosecute while the defendant was a prosecuting
attorney.
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was held by the Utah Supreme Court not to be a ground for disbarment. But
the North Dakota court in In re Vosse2 reached a contrary result on similar

facts under a statute which required prosecuting attorneys to bring complaints
as well as to prosecute them. There, failure of the prosecuting attorney to bring
complaints when he had knowledge of the illegal acts was held to be such a
gross neglect of his duties as to necessitate his disbarment. The court in the
principal case took the similar position that since it was the duty of the commonwealth's attorney to institute investigations, his failure to act on knowledge
which he possessed amounted to positive misconduct which required disenrollment.
Finally, there is the question whether federal courts should follow a hands-off
policy where the unprofessional conduct is that of a state officer. Commonwealth's attorneys of Kentucky are elective, constitutional officers.' s The sanctions prescribed to insure that they perform the duties of their offices are impeachment, indictment, and public election.4 The legislature had not impeached
the respondent. The grand jury had not indicted him. And the people of the
Sixteenth Judicial District had kept him in office since 1927."s Consequently, in

removing the respondent's name from its rolls, the federal court was requiring
of the respondent a higher standard in the performance of his duties than had
been required by the legislature, the grand jury, or the people. Possibly official
conduct which apparently satisfies those agencies which control it should satisfy
other branches of government. 6 Nevertheless, courts have held that the fact
that unprofessional conduct occurred in the discharge of a public office is not a
defense in disbarment proceedings.7 And in Commonwealth v. Stump'8 the fact
that the officer was a commonwealth's attorney was held to be an aggravating
circumstance, since the client involved was not an individual but the people.
12

i1

N.D.

54o, 90 N.W. iS (I902).

3 Ky. Const. § 97.

'4Northcutt v. Howard,

279 Ky. 219, 130 S.W. 2d 70 (i939); Ky. Const. §§ 68, 97.
isThe respondent was re-elected in 1933, 1939, and 1945.
6This involves, in part, the argument that the conduct of prosecuting attorneys should
reflect the sentiment of the electorate. Some courts, by refusing to suspend a prosecuting attorney for offenses otherwise grounds for suspension or by suspending him except with respect
to the duties of his office, have recognized the force of the argument that duly elected officials
should be permitted to represent their constituents; but none have held that a court cannot
disbar a prosecuting attorney if the offense is serious enough. Commonwealth v. Harrington,

266 Ky. 41, 98 S.W. 2d 53 (1936); Snyder's Case, 301 Pa. 276, 152 Atl. 33 (1930); State v.
Sanderson, 280 1o. 258, 217 S.W. 6o (i919); In re Maestretti, 3o Nev. 187, 93 Pac. 1004

(i9o8). The argument was rejected in the instant case and in others as well. Wilbur v. Howard,
32 Kan. 41, 3 Pac. 534 (1884); In re Voss,

70 F. Supp. 930, 934 (Ky., 1947); State v. Foster,
ix N.D. 540, 90 N.W. I5 (1902).

'7 Where the official will not be prevented by the disbarment from performing his duties,
there seems to be no question that serious official misconduct is ground for disbarment.
Authorities cited note io supra.
28Stump was disbarred for compromising a felony charge. 247 Ky. 589, 57 S.W. 2d 524

(1933).
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The court reasoned that this disbarment was not unconstitutional asamounting
to removal in a manner not prescribed by the constitution, since the court was
not removing the commonwealth's attorney from his office, but was only taking
away his right to practice law.19 This position seems well justified in view of the
necessity that a court exert discipline upon its attorneys, whose unprofessional
acts may discredit it.
This decision may be a significant precedent for influence by federal courts
over the conduct of state officers. Prosecuting attorneys in fear of federal disenrollment and possible subsequent state disbarment may feel compelled to perform their duties in a manner satisfactory to the federal courts of their district.
The federal court may therefore effectively prescribe standards for state's attorneys in the conduct of their offices, even though that conduct may relate solely
to the state. Moreover, if the federal courts have this power over prosecuting
attorneys, it would seem that they have it as well over other government officials, state or federal, whose duties require them to be attorneys.2 0 Safeguards
against abuse of this power exist in the requirements of elementary due process,
notice, and hearing laid down in Ex parte Wall.= But, however the federal
courts choose to use this power, it is clear that they have a potent weapon at
their disposal. The mere threat of disenrollment may at times be enough to
compel an otherwise remiss or dishonest official to perform the duties of his
office in accordance with the law.

VALIDATION OF MAIL-ORDER DIVORCE
THROUGH CHANGE OF DOMICILE
The plaintiff and her first husband were married in New York in 1929, and
were domiciled there until their separation. In 1934, a Mexican decree of
divorce was issued to the plaintiff, although neither the plaintiff nor her first
husband ever went to Mexico for the purpose of the divorce action. In 1935, the
plaintiff celebrated a ceremony of marriage with her alleged second husband,
with whom plaintiff resided in New Jersey until his death in r944. Shortly
thereafter, plaintiff applied for widow's insurance benefits under the Social
X"Courts of other states have similarly held. State v. Hays, 64 W. Va. 45, 6i S.E. 355
(xgo8); In re Voss, ir N.D. 540, 90 N.W. z5 (29o2); In re Simpson, 9 N.D. 379, 83 N.W. 54I
(igoo); In re Jones, 70 Vt. 7, 39 At. 1087 (1897). Later, in Commonwealth v. Howard, 297
Ky. 488, i8o S.W. 2d 415 (1944), the Kentucky Court of Appeal refused to remove a commonwealth's attorney in statutory proceedings similar to quo warranto on the ground that a
commonwealth's attorney is a constitutional officer removable only by impeachment.
2*This would not be true in some jurisdictions with respect to the disbarment of judges
where disbarment means loss of office. In re Silkman, 88 App. Div. 102, 84 N.Y. Supp. 1025
(I903); In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N.W. 379 (1927).
21 107 U.S. 265 (1883).

